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Abstract. This paper explores the different yet complementary aspects of the 
panopticon and the panspectron using the case study of the Israeli controlled 
Palestinian territory, the Gaza Strip. Beginning with a brief theoretical discussion 
of the concept of panopticon and panspectron expanding on the existing literature, 
the paper moves on to discuss the implementation of panoptical and panspectral 
technologies and practices in the Gaza Strip and situates these within a larger 
framework of control of the Palestinian population under Israeli occupation, and 
discusses seepage of these surveillance technologies into Israeli society proper and 
beyond into the international arena.   
1. From Panopticon to Panspectron 
In the late 18th Century, English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham 
designed an institutional building which he called the Panopticon. Bentham saw the 
design as “a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind in a quantity hitherto 
without example”. (Bentham, 1787/1995, p.i).  Essentially, the architecture of the 
building allowed surveillance of people at all times without the objects of surveillance 
knowing that they were being observed at any given moment. The constant observation 
or gaze of the authorities would then serve to affect and change behavior. Since then, 
Bentham’s panopticon has served as a model for the construction of prisons, and has 
become a metaphor for surveillance and “big brother”. Michel Foucault in Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975/1977) later continues the exploration of the 
panopticon from an institutional perspective noting that the role of the panopticon is “to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power” (p.199). The following passage from Orwell’s novel 
1984 summarizes succinctly the effect of panopticon:  
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched 
at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police 
plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even 
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time… You had to live – 
did live, from habit that became instinct – in the assumption that every 
sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every moment 
scrutinized (Orwell in Sclove 2000, p.22). 
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 Manuel DeLanda (1991; Palmas, 2011), describes how the National Security 
Agency in the US was putting together a surveillance system that he calls ‘the 
panspectron’. In contrast to the original panoptic architectures and social and 
organizational constructs of Bentham and Foucault, the panspectron monitors a wider 
segment of frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum, if not the entire spectrum. In 
other words, the panspectron not only registers that which is visible to the human eye 
but also radio, radar, microwaves, cellular communication, and so on: 
Instead of positioning some human bodies around a central sensor, a 
multiplicity of sensors is deployed around all bodies: its antenna farms, 
spy satellites and cable-traffic intercepts feed into its computers all the 
information that can be gathered. This is then processed through a series 
of ‘filters’ or key-word watch-lists. The Panspectron does not merely 
select certain bodies and certain (visual) data about them. Rather, it 
compiles information about all at the same time, using computers to select 
the segments of data relevant to its surveillance tasks (DeLanda, 1991, 
p.206). 
 While the panopticon is concerned primarily with individual surveillance and 
control, the panspectron is about mass surveillance and control: everything and 
everyone is observed all the time. The goal here to being to monitor as completely as 
possible what Floridi (2002) terms the “infosphere”. In many ways the Total 
Information Awareness (TIA) program instituted by the Pentagon in the aftermath of 
9/11 is panspectral in nature. While the program was discontinued in 2003, many 
components of the program continue to be developed under different names. An 
infographic provided by the now defunct US Information Awareness Office provides us 
with a possible conceptualization of the panspectron: 
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It is important to note here that panoptical and panspectral technologies are not 
mutually exclusive and can and often do coexist in given situations. Sandra Braman 
(2006) goes further and uses the concept of the panspectron to describe, among other 
aspects, the ability of what she terms the “informational state” to expand its sovereignty 
and control beyond its borders through technology. She observes (2006) that “in the 
panopticon environment the subject knows that the watcher is there, in the panspectron 
environment one may be completely unaware [and often is] that information is being 
collected”. Braman provides examples of panspectral technology usage at US border 
crossings, and by the TSA in non US airports as examples of the extension of 
sovereignty beyond national borders. Other countries use social networking sites to 
check arrivals at airports (see Fassahi, 2009). Indeed, even so called democratic and 
even “liberating” technology, such as Web 2.0 implementations credited with fueling 
the Arab Spring, have at their core panoptical and panspectral aspects, which we 
contribute freely in the framework of what Albrechtslund (2008) calls participatory 
surveillance: 
With the transition from a panopticon to a panspectron environment, the 
production of open information not only provides support for 
communities but also contributes to surveillance (Braman, 2006). 
Or as Andrejevic remarks: 
The participatory injunction of the interactive revolution extends 
monitoring techniques from the cloistered offices of the Pentagon to the 
everyday spaces of our homes and offices, from law enforcement and 
espionage to dating, parenting, and social life. In an era in which everyone 
is to be considered potentially suspect, we are invited to become spies – 
for our own good (Andrejevic, 2005, p.494). 
 Indeed, intelligence organizations thrive on the myriad mapping of social 
relationships which can be used to gain information and leverage against a specific 
subject. In particular they are concerned with the mapping of social networks of 
political activists and what they term subversive elements. Social networking platforms 
provide these organizations with this information voluntarily. This was indeed the case 
in most of the demonstrations in the Middle East over the past year, and prior to this in 
Iran during the protests against what was seen as election fraud on part of the ruling 
party. The same technologies that allowed for the dissemination of information and 
political mobilization also allow the intelligence and security organizations in these 
countries to track and arrest activists1. In the West Bank and Gaza information gathered 
by the security services allowed the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, respectively, to 
arrest organizers of demonstrations thus quelling demonstrations and dissent2. 
 While Tawil-Souri (2011), Zureik et al. (2010), and others have probed and 
exposed the differing aspects of panoptical control implemented by Israel in the Gaza 
Strip, as well as the West Bank, this paper seeks to expand the existing analysis by 
                                                 
1 See Open Net Initiative for country reports detailing net surveillance at http://opennet.net/ 
2 Information gleaned from anonymous interviews with members of Palestinian IT Association 
(PITA). 
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addressing additional dimensions of control, including panspectral control hereto 
unaddressed, as well as seepage into Israeli society and beyond of technologies of 
control tested and used in the West Bank and Gaza, such as the proposed biometric 
identity system, facial recognition systems, expansion of CCTV implementation and the 
internal use of surveillance balloons (previously used only at borders with Israel) and 
drones which allow security authorities to control all communications including internet 
access within a given area, as well as collect information and mount attacks via the 
remote controlled aerial drones. Once these technologies become normalized within a 
civilian context they then become the basis for policy. For example, behavioral and 
ethnic profiling, initially developed by Israel for aviation security (Whitaker, 2011) has 
now become the gold standard in airports around the world. Furthermore, technologies 
and methods developed in the course of control of the Gaza Strip are selectively 
implemented within Israeli society and beyond in the so called "war on terror", 
(Gordon, 2010) or for social control, and are then exported abroad. Indeed, in the wake 
of September 11 and the demand for homeland security technology (Rygiel, 2008, 
p.88), Israel has become a “24 hour showroom… Turning war into a brand asset” 
(Klein, 2007). Some have ventured so far as to suggest that the recent (February-March 
2012) violence in Gaza was instigated by Israel in order to showcase its “Iron Dome” 
technology – marketing it both to the public (to ease fears) in preparation for a possible 
war with Iran, and to the US and other countries as a solution for missile attacks. The 
process would seem to be reinforced by the dialectical relationship between the tool or 
technological solution, its uses and policy that is adopted in light of its apparent success. 
This is usually achieved with little public debate. Surveillance technologies thus seep 
from the battlefield to civilian use, providing the state with significant control of the 
civilian population, often under the pretense of the “war on terror” and the need for 
democracies to defend themselves from internal and external threats. Webster (1999) 
notes, states tend to exploit the application of new technology, particularly surveillance 
technology in order to strengthen their own legitimacy and deepen their control both 
internally and externally. Indeed it would seem that Israel expresses its sovereignty 
primarily as control.  
2. Gaza as Panopticon and Panspectron 
One of the most powerful strategies of imperial dominance is that of 
surveillance, or observation, because it implies a viewer with an elevated 
vantage point, it suggests the power to process and understand that which 
is seen, and it objectifies and interpellates the colonized subject in a way 
that fixes its identity in relation to the surveyor… The imperial gaze 
defines the identity of the subject, objectifies it within the identifying 
system of power relations and confirms its subalterneity and 
powerlessness (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1998, p.226, quoted in 
Zureik et al.). 
 The Gaza Strip lies on the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It is bordered 
on the southwest by Egypt, and by Israel on the east and the north. The Strip itself is 41 
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km long, and between 6 and 12 kilometers wide. Its total area is 360 square kilometers 
and contains a population of approximately 1.7 million, a majority of which are 
refugees. It is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. The Gaza Strip is 
physically separated from the rest of the Palestinian Territories in the West Bank. 
Following the Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, including 
the withdrawal of settlers and military, control of the Gaza Strip was assumed by the 
Palestinian Authority. In 2006 the Hamas won a majority of votes in the Gaza Strip and 
formed a national unity government with Fatah. In 2007 violence broke out between the 
Fatah and Hamas factions after which Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip and 
replaced Fatah officials with its own. Following Hamas control of the Gaza Strip, Israel 
instituted (with Egyptian assistance) a complete land closure and naval blockade of the 
Gaza Strip. This is also supported by Palestinian Monetary Authority which provides 
foreign (i.e. Israeli and American oversight) of financial transfers3. This has resulted in 
the Gaza Strip essentially becoming the world’s largest open air prison. The only 
effective way in or out of the Gaza Strip, whether people or commodities, is through a 
series of hundreds of underground tunnels connecting the Gaza Strip to Egypt. In fact, 
the only physical dimension of Gaza that Israel does not control is these tunnels, and the 
tunnels are the only way that Gazans can escape the imperial gaze. The tunnels also 
serve as a form of resistance to and egress from, the panoptical and panspectral gaze. 
Thus, in many ways Gaza resembles the dystopic visions expressed in cyberpunk 
literature, and is reminiscent of such movies as the 1981 Escape from New York. As 
Gary Fields explains: 
enclosure is thus the application of force to land by groups with territorial 
ambitions who mobilize the institutional power of law and the material 
power of architecture to reorder patterns of land ownership, use, and 
circulation and reorganize socioeconomic life and demography in a place 
(Fields, 2010, p.66). 
 Control of Gaza by the Hamas, as well as the closure forced Israel to invest in 
technological solutions for surveillance and control as they no longer had access to the 
extensive network of collaborators and informants which comprised Israel’s human 
intelligence within the Gaza Strip. As Sa’adi (2005) notes, Israel has relied on networks 
of informants within the occupied territories for decades. These physical networks were 
often supported by technological means. As Lyons (2001) points out, an analysis of 
surveillance is grounded on the fact that it is “real” people watching over others, but the 
new quality of surveillance lies in the fact that this “embodiment” lessens and is 
transferred to computers and other technological systems. This is clearly reflected in the 
evolution of the strategies of surveillance in the Gaza Strip. More so, Gaza has become 
the testing ground for new panoptical and panspectral technology in a hereto 
unprecedented form. 
 Among the technological mechanisms of surveillance and control in the Gaza Strip 
one may find the use of biometric identity cards, Israeli access to Palestinian census 
data, almost complete access to and control of the telecommunication infrastructure in 
                                                 
3 See Palestinian National Anti Money Laundering Committee at: http://www.ffu.ps/ 
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the Gaza Strip (Tawil-Souri 2011), the ability to track individuals via cell phone, large 
surveillance zeppelins (see photo below) which monitor the entire electromagnetic 
spectrum and which can usurp control of these from Palestinian operators (for instance 
sending text messages to subscribers targeting different demographics) as well as 
optical surveillance, unarmed  UAVs for surveillance and targeting, armed UAVs that 
carry out targeted assassinations, facial recognition technology (used for identifying 
individuals in large crowds of people – negating the possibility of public anonymity), 
remote controlled and robotic machine gun towers guarding the border that are capable 
of identifying a target and opening fire automatically – without human intervention. 
These technologies as well as the more recent “Iron Dome” (which targets missiles and 
is capable of destroying them in mid air) are being tested by the US army for defense of 
its bases in hostile areas like Afghanistan.  
 
 
Surveillance zeppelin permanently positioned above the Gaza Strip 
 I recently had the opportunity to view some of these technologies first hand at the 
Erez Crossing between Gaza and Israel4. The crossing has undergone a massive 
restructuring in recent years, and now resembles more than anything else, an airline 
terminal or ultra modern border crossing (see below). Originally conceived as the 
primary land crossing and entry point into Israel (prior to the 2007 closure) the structure 
is quite impressive and was intended to make the crossing seem more humane while at 
the same time providing maximum security to Israeli supervisors.  
 Beyond exploring the biometric identity system I was also sensitive to the 
architecture of the structure. Pedestrian flows within the terminal are directed in such a 
way as to prevent any direct contact between Israeli security and the Palestinians. 
Security officers (many of the crossings and checkpoints in the occupied territories have 
been privatized), patrol on gangways situated between the ceiling and the ground floor. 
Interior design attempts to hide varying aspects of control, including control of the flow 
of people within the terminal. The architecture eventually guides prospective entrants to 
a series of identification cubicles. Each cubicle has a biometric identity system 
composed of a biometric facial recognition system which compares the individual to the 
biometric facial data on his or her ID card and the biometric database maintained by 
Israel, a fingerprint system which reads all ten fingerprints (fingerprints are one of the 
                                                 
4 The tour was arranged informally and technically illegal. As a result my ability to document, 
particularly photograph, was severely limited. 
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first “scientific” forms of identification and were first used by the British colonial 
administration in India), and finally a biometric palm reader (the same palm reading 
system is used as a voluntary ID system at Ben Gurion airport to facilitate entry and exit 
for registered Israeli citizens). The prospective entrant must be identified by all 
components in order to gain entry. In addition to this each biometric identity card is also 
equipped with a unique RFID chip which allows for tracking within the terminal and 
beyond. Different aspects of the system can be seen in the photo below (one caveat 
regarding the photo: there is no physical presence in the cubicle with the Palestinian 
prospective entrant. The photo was provided by the ministry of defense). 
 
 
 
 
32 M. DAHAN 
 It is not only the geographical and technological closure that comprise the 
panopticon and panspectron that is the Gaza Strip. Then Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon 
described one of the goals of the “operation defensive shield” in 2002 during the second 
Intifada as being to “etch the consciousness” of the Palestinians in such a way and with 
such force that they would not even consider resistance, i.e. “resistance is futile”. This is 
a recurring theme in Israeli technological hegemony and in exerting its sovereignty and 
maybe found in the logic behind the stuxnet virus directed against Iranian nuclear 
facilities. Apparently a joint US/Israel cyber attack, beyond damage to the facilities one 
of the implications of its success is to suggest “we can get hold of you anywhere” or as 
Zurawski (2005) notes “we know where you live”. Perhaps most representative of this 
tactic was the targeted assassination by Israel in 1996 of Yahya Ayyash, a bomb maker 
for Hamas and one of the leaders of the Iz Adin al Qassam Brigade. He was killed by a 
small amount of explosive hidden in his cell phone. When he answered and his identity 
established the charge was detonated remotely, killing him instantly. Beyond the 
obvious purpose of assassination, the method used served to send a message of 
technological superiority to those challenging Israel. The “etching” was to be achieved 
by both military means and the use of great force (“shock and awe”), but also through 
technological control. This echoes Foucault’s “mind over mind” (1995:206). Indeed one 
of the main targets of information gathering during the operation by Israeli forces dealt 
with Palestinian census data and the wholesale rifling and destruction of the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics data files. The goal of “etching the consciousness” of the 
enemy has become an integral part of the “Operational Art” of the IDF (Rappaport, 
2010), and was practiced during the Second Lebanon War as well, with Israel using 
massive firepower directed at infrastructures as well as commandeering of cellular 
networks and television stations. Text messages were sent directly to citizens’ cell 
phones during defensive shield, the Gaza incursions and the Second Lebanon War 
(Rappaport, 2010). 
3. Seepage of Panoptical and Panspectral Technologies 
Israel controls 70% of the market in aerial drones (UAVs) (used for observation and 
attack) and is a leader in the development of border surveillance technologies, such as 
sensors, aviation security systems and protocols, fences, electro-optical equipment, and 
robotic gun systems (Denes, 2011; Gordon, Zureik, & Kloostermann, 2010). In 
addition, a macro level view of the hi-tech sector in Israel shows an inordinate amount 
of research and development in the field of surveillance and data collection as well 
computer security systems. Earlier research has shown that the roots of the Israeli hi 
tech sector are in Military Intelligence (particularly one specific signals intelligence 
unit, Unit 8200) and the defense industries. The “special relations” between Israel and 
The US provide Israel with access to large markets in North America, Europe, 
Azerbaijan and Eastern Europe, China, India, and until recently, Turkey. 
 The clearest seepage of control technologies developed in the context of the 
occupation into Israel proper is the proposed use of biometric ID cards for Israeli 
citizens. Israel has long used a system of differentiated ID cards to distinguish between 
Jews and non Jews, citizens and residents of Israel, and citizens and residents of the 
33 THE GAZA STRIP AS PANOPTICON AND PANSPECTRON  
occupied territories. These ID cards are color coded: Blue for Israeli citizens and Arab 
residents (but not citizens) of East Jerusalem, orange for Palestinian residents of the 
West Bank and Gaza. The ID cards also note ethnic/religious affiliation, and the ID 
numbers themselves are coded so as to reflect this information. In fact this system of 
identification is perhaps the oldest example of social sorting in Israel. ones identity 
status, whether citizen or resident, Israeli or Palestinian determines your freedom to 
travel (both within Israel and abroad), ones ability to marry and to receive social 
benefits, as well as ones ability to find employment.  
 In 2008 the Interior Ministry, the government entity responsible for administering 
the national registry, began to advance what was initially called “Smart ID”, but later 
became known as biometric ID card. According to then-Interior Minister, Meir Sheetrit, 
biometric cards would assist in ‘uprooting crime, foiling terror attacks and identifying 
victims’ (Ilan, 2009)5. While the project has been delayed due to public pressure and is 
currently classified as a non mandatory pilot, individuals arrested during this pilot 
period have had their biometric data taken and added to the database. It is expected that 
after the two year trial registration with the database will be mandatory and lack to 
comply will be punishable by law. Israel has also pressured Palestinians to create their 
own biometric database and hand it over to Israel in the interest of “biometrization”6. 
 In 2007 the Israeli parliament approved a bill dubbed the “Big Brother” law, 
permitting police to establish a massive database or search engine based on telecom 
information. The new law allows police to request a judge’s warrant to obtain 
communications data from a database that includes telephone numbers, names and real 
time location of mobile phone subscribers, hard serial numbers of mobile phones, and 
maps of cellular antenna locations. Under certain conditions high ranking police officers 
can obtain this information without prior judicial consent. The Knesset rejected requests 
to grant the police authority to receive lists of internet addresses in Israel (Ilan, 2007). 
As a result, eavesdropping by the police and security services increased tenfold (Ilan, 
2008). In addition, secret police units have been conducting surveillance of Israeli 
citizens (including political activists) using a myriad of methods (Zarchin, 2009). 
 Furthermore, a secret appendix exists in all telecommunication licenses issued by 
the Ministry of Communication. All communications providers are required to be 
licensed by law. In the license is a secret appendix or codicil which explicitly demands 
that telecommunications companies hand over, by request of the security services any 
information related to voice calls and text messages, location information and usage 
patterns. There is little or no evidence of Internet surveillance or deep packet inspection 
                                                 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the issues as voiced in the Israeli press, see: Ilan, Shahar 
(2009/03/15) ‘Plan to introduce biometric IDs stirs privacy debate’, Haaretz. 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1070793.html;  
Ilan, Shahar (2008/05/18) ‘Police wiretaps climb sharply in peripheral areas’, Haaretz. 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=984365 
Ilan, Shahar (2007/12/18) ‘Knesset okays establishment of “Big Brother” database for 
police’. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=935812&contrassID=0 
&subContrassID=0 
6 See Hass, Amira (2009/11/25) ‘Voyeurism’, Haaretz. 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1130498.html 
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in Israel proper, nor is their much in the Palestinian Territories: the majority of 
blockages are related to sites with sexual content. It is worthy to note here though that 
Israel controls almost all the bandwidth in the occupied territories as well as much of 
the electromagnetic spectrum – obstensively for security reasons (World Bank 2008a, 
2008b). 
 Another technology that has found its way into use by the police is facial 
recognition technology. Initially developed and tested by the military in order to 
identify both Israeli and Palestinian protestors during demonstrations against the wall in 
Bili’n and Ne’alin villages near Ramallah7. This technology is now being used by the 
police to identify protestors within Israel proper (cross referencing with the national 
register), and is being implemented at airports and border crossings. The surveillance 
zeppelin has also made a number of appearances in Israel, usually during visits of heads 
of state but also during large public protests. These surveillance zeppelins provide the 
operators with control over telecommunications in a certain radius, including the 
Internet. All of these technologies as well as additional surveillance technologies form 
the backbone of an extensive exportation of surveillance technologies abroad in the 
framework of homeland security. Over 300 Israeli companies are actively involved in 
the homeland security sector. For an informed discussion on the political economy of 
Israel’s home land security sector see Neve Gordon (Gordon, 2010). Analysis of Israel’s 
UAV industry is provided by Nick Denes (2010).  
 Israel has adopted a screening and surveillance model that is openly and routinely 
used. Israeli behavioral profiling methods, Whitaker (2011) suggests, are arguably 
necessary for a state fixated on the importance of ever-improving security measures. At 
the same time the author problematizes the racially-based deployment and development 
of such security protocols. 
 In addition to being a significant developer and exporter of surveillance 
equipment, the Israel’s military/security industry is also a world leader in the perfection 
of surveillance methodologies and techniques (Morley, 2012). Using the airport as a 
case study, Whitaker examines screening procedures that were developed and 
implemented by Israel and its security services (see Kloosterman 2010). Similarly, 
Pfeffer (2009) analyses the development of racial profiling as an anti-terrorist and 
security measure initially used by Israel’s security agencies within airports. This method 
is credited with virtually eliminating all terrorist attacks in Israeli airports since the 
1970s. ‘Many Israelis have no problems with this [strategy]’, Pfeffer asserts. ‘Let the 
Muslims suffer for the sins of their brothers they say. But those of us who like to think 
of ourselves as liberal humanists find it all too easy to ignore the sight of entire families 
having their luggage rummaged through in front of the entire terminal while we are 
waved through’. In this sense, privileged Jewish Israeli’s become complacent, even 
comfortable with the extent to which the security apparatus provides them protection, 
while simultaneously disenfranchising and oppressing others. It is not hard to imagine 
similar sentiments being expressed in the US in light of behavioral and racial profiling. 
Much of Whitaker’s argument can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
7 I first became aware of during interviews conducted with IDF reservists. I have been unable to 
receive confirmation by the IDF, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Security nor has this 
been reported in the press.  
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Looked at strictly as a security measure, Israeli passenger profiling has a number 
of strengths. Even its critics acknowledge that it works. However, looking at it 
simply as a socially and politically neutral security technique misses a great deal 
that is critical to grasping the significance of passenger profiling in its specific 
Israeli context (2011, p.383, emphasis in original). 
4. Conclusion 
While many of the technologies discussed in the framework of “seepage” can be 
understood in terms of Giddens’ (1985) (and echoed by Lyon, 2001) proposed 
connection between citizenship rights and surveillance (based in turn on Marshall’s 
(1973) typology of political, social and economic rights in the modern state) i.e the 
policing or security aspect of surveillance and the role of surveillance in the provision of 
rights, the changes in approaches to political thinking in a post 9/11 reality coupled with 
restrictions on political liberties, (primarily in the US, Israel, Russia, the UK and 
France) the rise of populism and the general backlash against democracy – often 
precursors to authoritarianism –  brings us one step closer to the panspectron within 
modern and currently democratic societies. Indeed, it would seem that in recent years, in 
response to threats of terrorism and economic instability, liberal democracies, with the 
aid of technologies of surveillance and control, are rapidly shedding liberal 
characteristics and moving toward a form of democracy where the state has a great deal 
of potential control of the population. As Giddens notes, “aspects of totalitarian rule are 
a threat” in all advanced societies precisely because surveillance is “maximized in the 
modern state” (Giddens, 1985, p.310). The case of the Gaza Strip, unique as both an 
open air prison and as a live example of panoptical and panspectral technologies is 
informative at two levels: the attempt by Israel to use these technologies in order to gain 
complete and total panspectral control in a Deleuzian sense (and to punish when 
deemed necessary by Israel) while serving as a testing ground for similar technologies 
to be implemented in the framework of advanced societies. One only need to look at the 
narratives of control surrounding immigration issues in the US and Europe, the 
unprecedented use of surveillance technologies (particularly CCTV, vehicle tracking in 
large cities, the “participatory surveillance” of social media, the proliferation of location 
based mobile technology and the use of police drones) to consider that the future may 
not bode well. 
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